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1. INTRODUCTION
Oswald and Hart have provided us with a very nice account of the cognitive
constraints on identifying fallacies in argument processing. To accomplish this,
Professors Oswald and Hart have borrowed from cognitive science and evolutionary
linguistics. Although I believe they could have excavated more, their analysis, on the
whole, provides the argumentation theorist with yet another tool in fallacy analyses.
Their exposition begins by situating how their account of the rhetorical
effectiveness of fallacies is not the standard fare. That is, by examining three types
of source-related fallacies Oswald and Hart would like us to accept their claim that
“source-related fallacies exploit our processing mechanisms, which are usually
reliable and accurate, but which are … inherently fallible.”
2. THE DELIVERY
We begin with a standard, yet robust account of three fallacies using Walton’s
argumentation scheme (Walton, 2006). Specifically ad verecundium, ad populum,
and ad hominem are addressed due to their inherent similarities. That is, all three
argument schemes play on the reliability and/or credibility of the third parties
invoked. For ad verecundium it is the perceived reliability of an expert, for ad
populum the weight of a widespread belief, and for the ad hominen the lack of
credibility or reliability of the third party is invoked.
What we discover is that Walton’s critical questions -- the questions
according to Walton which determine whether or not a particular instantiation of an
argument scheme is fallacious – are in fact contained in our own cognitive
competencies. These are referred to as “epistemic vigilance” in the literature.
The pragmatic necessity of having a stabilized language aside, epistemic
vigilance is both content- and source-directed. For the former, obviously,
plausibility and consistency are factors. Source-directed vigilance requires the
audience to assess trustworthiness of the speaker, expertise, and more. On Oswald
and Hart’s account, fallacies are objectionable, ie., effective, when they overcome
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epistemic vigilance. Translated, this means that Walton’s critical questions do not
yield cause for being even more vigilant – namely for the system to gather or
mobilize additional information that would be critical on Walton’s account.
To make sense of how this can occur, Oswald and Hart hinge their argument
on what could only be described cognitive science’s version of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics: systems settle with least energy and maximum randomness.
Likewise, human cognition has evolved to favour least processing effort –
accessibility – while favouring epistemic strength. Relevance, on this account, play
on accessibility (recall the source-related fallacies are, in the end, fallacies of
relevance) while scaling with epistemic value. It would have benefitted the reader
to see how Oswald and Hart would unpack relevance questions and their heuristic
value.
Although relevance plays a role, an important one at that, in dealing with
source-related fallacies, cognitive biases also come into play. The authors highlight,
by example, a conformity bias that promotes social cooperation. For instance, one
might find oneself in a community of colleagues who generally accept Walton’s use
of argument schema. The conformity bias would urge us, in order to be prudent, to
go along and accept Walton’s position. Failure to do so could compromise one’s
social clout. By way of example. Indeed, Oswald and Hart claim: “It usually pays to
go along with majorities because to do so is efficient and because not to do so
compromises one’s social inclusion. It may pay to go along with authorities for
similar reasons. Moreover, experts possess information in particular domains which
hearers might not otherwise have access to and which, by virtue of their expertise, is
usually reliable. It is therefore perfectly rational to take the word of an expert.
Fallacies, in sum then, work in convincing audiences because they exploit the
inherent fallibility of heuristics which are, in the normal course of events, helpful.”
Efficiency then amounts to intellectual laziness, an exercise in “amusing ourselves to
death” to quote Postman.
Fallacy studies, on this account, cold benefit from understand the root of why
fallacies work as rhetorical devices. That fallacies have certain forms or can be
analysed in certain ways is one thing; with some liberty, if I may extend Oswald and
Hart’s point, fallacy studies would be enriched instead of simply looking at “that p”
but rather what should be examined is the “why p” – why the audience might fall for
a fallacy.
3. CONCLUSION
I would suggest that the argumentation community might benefit in looking at the
lessons from cognitive science. Oswald and Hart have given us a glimpse into this. It
is not clear from their analysis how Walton’s schema could not accommodate as
critical questions the heuristics and biases that could be used to defend against the
rhetorical effectiveness of fallacies. To be sure, prior to reading Oswald and Hart,
one could argue that argument schema and critical questions aid in addressing
fallacious arguments and one could be forgiven for not disclosing all the relevant
information needed to counter a fallacious argument. Indeed, many of us might
teach logic (broadly construed) with Aristotle in mind: name we study reasoning so
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that we can reason better and to appreciate good reasoning when exposed to it.
After reading Oswald and Hart, one has a better sense of what has to be “unlearned”
in studying reasoning, all the while knowing what are the right questions to ask.
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